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ABSTRACT 
Public policy is one of the defenses that a court or a party may invoke in order to 
resist enforcement of an unjust foreign award or judgment. The purpose of this 
study is to analyze the status of the public policy as a defense to enforcement in 
the U.S and to examine its success rate. The thesis will contain suggestions to 
make public policy a more meaningful defense with respect to the enforcement of 
foreign judgments and its role in bringing about uniformity in the field of foreign 
judgments will be analyzed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The importance of arbitration as a tool in resolving international conflicts cannot 
be overstated. It offers various advantages like consistency, fairness, flexibility 
and confidentiality that may be lacking in a foreign judicial forum.1 With the 
multifold increase in international trade and commerce, often arbitral awards and 
foreign judgments from one country will have to be enforced by the courts in 
another country.2 For instance, the defendant’s assets may be located in the 
other country. This is a common scenario in international commercial disputes 
where the litigants belong to different countries. The effectiveness of an 
international award or a foreign judgment in turn depends on its effective 
enforcement.3 The losing party may resist an award or judgment against them by 
raising various defenses at the enforcement stage, public policy being one such 
defense. 
            This thesis will be an extensive study on the status of the public policy 
defense to the enforcement of foreign awards and judgments in the United 
States. Attempts will be made to compare the functioning of this defense in both 
these contexts. The cases reveal that courts are willing to enforce awards in 
                                                 
1 Susan Choi, Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Awards under the ICSID and New York       
Conventions, 28 N.Y.U. J. Int’L. & Pol.175 (1996). 
2 Kenneth-Michael Curtin, Redefining public policy in International Arbitration of National 
Mandatory Laws , 64 Def. Couns. J. 271 (1997). 
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order to facilitate international commerce although it may result in occasional 
injustice to the parties involved. The thesis will contain suggestions to make 
public policy a more meaningful defense with respect to the enforcement of 
awards and the role of this exception in bringing about uniformity in the field of 
foreign judgments will be analyzed. 
            The study is divided in six main parts. Chapter 1 is the introduction. In 
Chapter 2, the meaning of the term public policy is discussed. This chapter will 
also describe its scope, applicability and the types, namely domestic and 
international public policy.    
            Chapter 3 analyzes the role of this defense in the enforcement of foreign 
arbitration agreements and awards under the New York Convention. After a brief 
look into the New York Convention, the standard of public policy followed by U.S. 
courts is analyzed. A detailed study of some of the cases where this defense has 
been rejected and a case where it was successful is also done. Also discussed in 
this chapter is the arbitrability of certain national laws in the field of securities, 
antitrust and RICO statues.  
            Chapter 4 deals with the public policy defense and foreign judgments. It 
includes a brief description into the sources of law and the requirements in order 
to recognize a foreign judgment. In addition cases where foreign judgments were 
found to be consistent with U.S. public policy and vice-versa are illustrated.  
            Chapter 5 will compare the functioning of the public policy defense in the 
context of foreign awards and judgments followed by the conclusion in chapter 6. 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 Ramona Martinez, Recognition and Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards under the 
United Nations Convention of 1958: The Refusal Provisions, 24 Int’l Law. 487 (1990). 
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The thesis finally concludes with a brief summary and recommendations for the 
continued existence and effectiveness of public policy, as a defense to 
enforcement.
 4 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
MEANING AND TYPES OF PUBLIC POLICY 
There is no precise definition for the term public policy. To quote a famous 
criticism, Judge Burrough in an old English case stated that, “it is an unruly horse 
and once you get astride it, you don’t know where it will carry you”.4 The reason 
for its various criticisms being that it lacks consistency, predictability and 
uniformity. It generally refers to the grounds on which a receiving court may 
vacate an award or judgment that is contrary to the law or standards of the 
court’s jurisdiction.5 The standard of public policy varies between countries 
because it is interpreted by the legislature and judiciary of each country.  
            This doctrine has found its way in two major areas of law. It is directly 
applicable in the field of contracts and is indirectly applicable in the choice of law 
rules. When parties make contractual agreements violating state laws they are 
not enforced because it is against that states public policy.6 Rights and duties 
based on illegal contracts such as a gambling contract is a good example.  Its 
applicability is more complex when parties choose foreign law as the choice of 
law under their contract. The question then is whether applying the foreign law 
                                                 
4 Richardson, 130 Eng. Rep. at 303. 
5 Jay R. Server, The relaxation of inarbitrability & public policy checks in U.S. and foreign 
arbitration: Arbitration out of control? , 65 Tul. L. Rev. 1661, *1663 (1991). 
6 Michael Mousa Karayanni, The Public policy exception to the enforcement of forum selection, 
34 Duq. L. Rev. 1009, *1014 (1996).  
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will violate the basic judicial principles of the enforcing state. As a general rule, 
penal and revenue judgments of one country are not enforced in another state.7 
             Public policy is divided into two major types: 
Domestic public policy   
 When arbitration is associated to a particular country, only that country’s 
domestic policy will be considered by the enforcing court.8 The court analyzes 
whether enforcement would violate the local norms and the well established 
principles of that country’s justice and morality.9 Domestic public policy is 
expressed by the laws of that state and its judicial practices. Thus if the court or 
the parties involved can raise a strong case that enforcement would violate the 
domestic public policy, fraud in the agreement or due process violations for 
instance, then enforcement will be denied.  
International public policy  
 When arbitration has an international character and different countries are 
involved, the enforcing court should not only consider its own public policy but 
also that of interested nations and the needs of international commerce.10 There 
is a kind of balancing of interest and depending on the case at hand and the 
interests of the involved states a determination is made as to which country’s 
policy will prevail. International public policy is generally construed more liberally 
than that of its domestic counterpart.11  This is clearly exemplified in the cases of 
Scherk and Mitsubishi where the Supreme Court upheld the agreement to 
                                                 
7 Id. at 1015. 
8 See supra note 2 at 280. 
9 See id. 
10 Id. at 281. 
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arbitrate claims under the Securities and Sherman Acts purely on the basis of the 
international character involved. The Court balanced the interest of promotion of 
international arbitration on one hand and public policy on the other when deciding 
on the relevant issues.  
            Thus most countries specifically distinguish between domestic and 
international public policies. U.S. courts are of the view that “international public 
policy cannot be equated to that of the domestic one, but needs to be given 
supranational emphasis.”12 Also courts are much slower in invoking the public 
policy grounds out of “concerns for international comity, respect for foreign law 
and tribunals and advancement and smooth functioning of international trade”.13 
            Some scholars suggest a third classification, namely transnational public 
policy. This type is very vague and difficult to apply. General principles of law, 
customs and usages of the business community are to be applied without 
inquiring if the dispute is related to any particular country or taking into account 
the public policy of the interested states.14 Critics argue that this has various 
advantages like uniformity and flexibility and that this type comes into play when 
arbitration is governed by the principles of lex mercatoria. Transnational public 
policy is highly controversial because of the absence of any distinguishing 
features from international public policy. The lack of clear guidelines as to what 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 See supra text accompanying note 5. 
12 Parsons, 508 F. 2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974). 
13 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614, 636 (1985). 
14 See supra note 8 at 282. 
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constitutes transnational principles and its extensive similarities with international 
public policy raises questions as to its very existence.15
                                                 
15 Id. 
 8 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
PUBLIC POLICY DEFENSE & ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN AWARDS 
Overview of the New York Convention 
In the United States, arbitration is generally governed by the principles of the 
Federal Arbitral Association except when it conflicts with the New York 
Convention. The New York Convention which is the most important convention in 
the field of arbitration “aims to facilitate the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign awards between private parties”.16 It has been widely accepted and over 
120 countries are parties to the Convention. The scope of the convention is laid 
down in Article I.  Article II states that member states to the Convention shall 
recognize and enforce agreements that contain a subject matter that is capable 
of being resolved by arbitration.17 Article III requires contracting states to enforce 
foreign awards in a similar manner like those of domestic awards and not to 
impose additional fees or conditions. Article IV relates to the procedure involved 
in proving the award.   
            Article V (1) contains a list of general defenses to enforcement. An award 
can be set aside if the agreement underlying the arbitration is invalid or if there is 
a violation of due process.18 Irregularity in the composition of the arbitral tribunal 
and excess of authority by the arbitrator are also grounds for non-enforcement. If 
                                                 
16 Supra note 1 at 187. 
17 Article II of The Convention on the Recognition & Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. 
18 Id art V(1)(a). 
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the arbitrator steps over the limits in terms of authority, that is another ground for 
non-enforcement. Finally courts may refuse enforcement if the award is not 
binding or has been set aside. Article V (2) contains two additional defenses, 
namely the public policy defense and the inarbitrability defense that will be dealt 
with in depth in the following pages.  
Public Policy Defense and Standard 
            Art. V 2b states that” recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award 
may be refused if the competent authority in the country where enforcement is 
sought finds that doing so would be contrary to the public policy of that 
country”.19 It is also referred to as the “second look doctrine” because a party 
against whom an award has been made gets a second chance to resist it at the 
enforcement stage.20 This is what happened in the famous anti trust case of 
Mitsubishi v Solar where the Supreme Court projected this line of thought. It is 
sometimes referred to as the “safety valve because it is subject to interpretation 
by the legislative and judicial process of each nation”.21 
             A bird’s eye view indicates that this defense would be a major obstacle to 
the smooth functioning of international arbitration. A literal interpretation would 
have jeopardized the meaningful purpose of the New York Convention. So courts 
have followed a practical interpretation and have upheld this defense only when it 
would be contrary to the very basic legal principles of the country where 
enforcement is sought.  The foundation for the public policy principle was laid 
                                                 
19 New York Convention, see id. art. V(2)(b). 
20 see supra note 8 at 274. 
21 Heather R. Evans, Note, The Nonarbitrability of Subject Matter Defense to Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards in the U.S. Federal Courts, 21 N.Y.U. J. Int’l. L. & Pol. 329, 334-35 (1989) 
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down in the famous case of Parsons & Whittmore Overseas Co. v Societe 
Generale de l’Industrie du Papier.  
            This case was one of the early cases to reach the appellate level after the 
adoption of the convention. The principle laid down in this case has become the 
basis for determining whether public policy of U.S has been violated or not and 
has been cited in almost all cases where this defense is raised. The dispute 
related to a contract between Parsons, an American company and Rakta, an 
Egyptian Corporation over the construction of a paper mill in Egypt. The outbreak 
of the Arab Israel Six Days War of 1967 was followed by withdrawal of financial 
support by the U.S. Government to the project and subsequent souring of foreign 
relations between the two countries.22  
            Since the U.S. Government withdrew its financial back up, Parsons 
invoked the “force majeure” clause of the contract that relieved responsibility if 
factors beyond the control of the parties justified non-performance of the 
contract. Rakta commenced arbitration proceeding as per the contract and 
obtained an award in their favor.23 Efforts by Parsons in trying to nullify the award 
by raising the public policy defense failed. The second circuit court refused to 
identify U.S foreign policy with public policy and enforced the arbitral award that 
the Egyptian company had obtained for breach of contract.24  
            The principle laid down in this case was that “Enforcement will be denied 
only if it violates the forum states most basic notion of morality and justice.”25 The 
                                                 
22 Parsons& Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 972. 
23 Id. 
24 See id. at 969. 
25 Id. at 974. 
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court also made a distinction between public policy and national policy and held 
that the former should be given a superior effect. A study of other cases will show 
that American courts have always rejected this defense because the Parsons 
standards were not duly met.  
Cases Rejecting the Public Policy Defense. 
The public policy defense has been given a very narrow construction by U.S. 
courts. Most courts have enforced arbitral awards even if circumstances 
compelled otherwise. A look into some of the American cases will cast light on 
this extra precautious approach followed by the courts. 
 1. Fertilizer Corporation of India v. IDI  
A brief look into the facts suggests that this should have been an ideal case for 
non-enforcement because of the tainted nature of the arbitration. The arbitral 
agreement provided for a panel of three arbitrators chosen by parties. One of the 
arbitrators selected by FCI, the winning party, had represented them in earlier 
arbitrations, a fact that was not disclosed.26 The existence of the former attorney-
client relationship was not revealed and FCI, falsely denied the allegations made 
by IDI. The court however denied the motion to reconsider stating that the 
irregularity did not measure up to the Parsons standards and enforced the 
award.27  
             One of the most basic principles in any arbitration is that arbitrator should 
be neutral and free from the appearance of any bias. This was definitely a blow 
to public policy and the courts reasoning was that although disclosure would 
                                                 
26 517 F. Supp 948 (S.D. Ohio 1981) at 953. 
27 Id. at 955. 
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have been preferable, the rules governing that arbitration did not specifically 
require such a revelation.28 A more compelling reason was promoting the smooth 
functioning of international arbitration and this could be achieved only by finality 
of proceedings.   
2. Waterside Ocean Navigation Company v. International Navigation 
In this case that involved a dispute between the owner of a shipping vessel and 
its charterer, the question of sanctity of oath was in issue. The latter party 
challenged enforcement of award claiming that it was based on inconsistent 
sworn testimony by the witness. The witness for the International Navigation in a 
prior testimony stated that the ship was sub chartered, but in a later testimony 
took the stand that the sub charterer in fact was an agent as he did not have a 
share in the financial aspects of the vessel.29 His testimony was taken into 
account by the arbitrators and a decision was rendered in favor of the charterers. 
The court reasoned that the witness did not knowingly perjure himself. Hence the 
argument that U.S. policy of protecting the value of testimonial oath was being 
violated, did not carry sufficient weight.30 
            Both the district court and the appellate court rejected the owner’s 
argument and refused to equate the policy against inconsistent witness 
statement with the basic notions of morality and justice. In the words of the 
Second Circuit Court, “the public policy defense must be construed in the light of 
the purpose of the Convention and the purpose is to encourage enforcement of 
                                                 
28 See id. 
29 737 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1984). 
30 Id. at 151. 
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foreign arbitral awards”.31Thus even when the integrity of the judicial system was 
in question the public policy defense was not effective.    
3. Brandeis Intsel Ltd v. Calabrian Chemicals Corporation 
This case involved a dispute was between the seller and purchaser of chemicals. 
The court confirmed an award that was rendered by the arbitration panel in favor 
of the purchaser. The seller’s argument was that there was “manifest disregard of 
the law”, since the purchaser and the members of the arbitration panel were all 
members of the London Mercantile Exchange.32 The court however rejected this 
argument and held that although the facts implicated the public policy defense 
there was no mischief involved, and that manifest disregard of the law did not 
meet the standards of contravention of public policy.33  
            The court also distinguished this case from that of Commonwealth 
Coating Corp. v. Continental Gas Co. where the Supreme Court rejected an 
arbitration award when a financial relationship was present between one of the 
parties and the arbitrator, a fact which the other party had no knowledge of.  
However, this kind of commercial relationship was absent here. 
            With respect to the Calabrian’s argument that the arbitrators had wrongly 
applied the British Sale of Goods Act of 1979, the court made a distinction 
between enforcement of a void contract and a wrong application of the rules of a 
valid contract and stated that the purchaser’s argument fell in the second 
                                                 
31 Id. at 152. 
32 Brandeis Intsel Ltd. v. Calabrian Chemicals Corp., 656 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 
33 See id. at 165. 
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category.34 Thus the award was confirmed even though there was irregularity in 
the application of the law. 
 4. A case where enforcement should have been denied was that of National Oil 
Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Co. There was a contract by an American oil company to 
conduct oil exploration in Libya. However the American company failed to fulfill 
its part of the deal when the foreign policy between U.S. and Libya deteriorated. 
The U.S. government barred Americans from traveling to Libya. Arbitration was 
subsequently held and $20 million was awarded in damages to the Libyan 
company.35  The American company invoked the public policy defense and tried 
to set aside the award. Their main arguments were that enforcement would result 
in punishing a company for simply obeying the Government’s foreign policy.36 It 
would also bar other companies from supporting the Government’s sanctions. 
Secondly, it would be inconsistent with the U.S. Government’s anti-terrorist policy 
and enforcement would result in indirect support to Libya’s pro-terrorist 
activities.37 
             Although the court was aware of the truth involved in National Oil Corp’s 
arguments, and that Libya was not a member to the New York Convention, it 
refused to equate foreign policy with public policy and held that the Parsons test 
was not met in this case and that enforcement would not result in violations of the 
                                                 
34 Andrew M. Campbell, Refusal to Enforce Foreign Arbitration Awards on public policy grounds, 
144 A. L. R. Fed. 481 (1998). 
35 National Oil Corp., 733 F. Supp at 819. 
36 See supra note 34. 
37 Id. at 320. 
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basic principles of morality and justice. Thus the court went to the extent of 
confirming an award in favor of a state that sponsored terrorism.38  
5. American Construction v Mechanized Construction of Pakistan. This is a case 
where the U.S. court went to the extent of enforcing an arbitration award even 
when there was a foreign judgment nullifying the arbitration. This case involved a 
contract agreement between the two parties. ACME, the plaintiff began ICC 
arbitration against MCP for breach of contract of supply of goods and services.39 
Although MCP initially submitted to arbitration it later was of the view that the 
arbitration was not valid under Pakistani laws and obtained a Pakistani judgment 
to that effect.  An arbitration award was rendered in favor of ACME and MCP 
raised the public policy defense to enforcement.  
            The court however as in earlier cases narrowed the application of this 
defense and held that the Pakistani judgment was defective in nature because of 
certain omissions and misrepresentations and also that MCP had in fact tried to 
escape the results of arbitration.40 This case shows that courts have set a 
stringent standard for the successful implication of the public policy defense and 
existence of a foreign judgment against the arbitration award does not meet this 
standard. Thus it should be no surprise to see that this defense has been rarely 
successful. 
                                                 
38 Supra note 35 at 820. 
39 American Construction Machinery & Equipment Corp., v. Mechanized Construction of Pakistan, 
659 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
40 Joseph T. McLaughlin, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards under the New York Convention, 
Practice in U.S. Courts, 477 PLI/Comm 275, *293. 
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Case Recognizing Public Policy 
A detailed study of the U.S. cases shows that there have been only a couple of 
instances where this defense has been successful. The case of Laminoirs-
Cableries de Lens, S.A. v Southwire Co. involved a dispute between a French 
seller and an American buyer over price and interest rates in a purchase contract 
for steel wire.41 The arbitration panel applying the foreign law required 
defendants the payment of interest running at the rate of 9.5 and 10.5%. The 
argument by the losing party was that enforcement of the award was against the 
public policy of the U.S. The court accepted this defense only in part, and refused 
to enforce the award which applying the French law imposed an additional rate of 
5% per annum if the award was not fully paid within a certain date.42 The court 
regarded this additional fee as a penalty as it was a way of punishing someone 
for omission of an act instead of compensating for private loss suffered by them 
and held that enforcement of this portion of the award would violate the public 
policy of U.S.  
            The court however enforced the other part of the award that imposed 
higher interest rates. According to the Georgia law, even though the accepted 
rate was about 7%, parties could contract a higher rate, and there was no limit to 
the rate that parties could set in writing if the amount exceeded $100,000 or 
more.43 Thus the court enforced the award because there were no public policy 
violations and it also stated that and stated that, “Americans could not have trade 
                                                 
41 484 F. Supp. 1063 (N. D. Ga. 1980). 
42 Id. at 1068. 
43 Id. at 1069. 
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and commerce exclusively in their own terms, governed by their own laws and 
decided by their own courts”.44 
. 
Due Process Clause 
The due process clause can be found in Article V(1)(b) and V(1)(d) of the New 
York Convention. As the concepts of due process and public policy exist side by 
side, this will also be considered. Art V 1b states that, “Enforcement will be 
refused if the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper 
notice of the proceedings or was unable to present his case”.45 
            In the case of Parsons Whittmore, the due process defense was raised 
by the American company. Their argument was that the arbitrators had not 
conducted the hearing in the fair manner as one of their witnesses was not 
present. They claimed that the witness had a prior commitment and wanted the 
hearing to be postponed.46 The court rejected this defense and stated that a 
speaking engagement would not justify rescheduling an international 
arbitration.47 Thus this defense has also been narrowly construed by courts. U.S. 
courts look into the case as a whole and do not refuse enforcement if the 
defendant was not given the opportunity to present a portion of his case, 
especially if it would not reverse the outcome of the case. 
            On the other hand, this defense has been successful in certain other 
cases. In Iran Aircraft Industries v. Avco Corp., the award was not enforced 
                                                 
44 See id. 
45 New York Convention, supra note 17, art. V (1)(b). 
46 508 F.2d at 975. 
47 See id. 
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because defendant was denied the opportunity to present his case in a 
meaningful manner. In a pre-hearing conference, the defendant was allowed to 
submit audited accounts instead of numerous invoices.48 Later, when the judge 
was replaced, the new judge disallowed the accounts and refused to buy the 
explanation put forth by the defendant. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit refused to enforce the Iran – U.S. Claims Tribunal award, because the 
tribunal had previously agreed to the method in which the defense was to be 
presented but later rejected the manner in which it was offered even though it 
was duly authorized by the tribunal.49 
            Thus it can be seen that though strictly construed, this defense has been 
relatively more successful than its public policy counterpart and courts have 
given effect to the due process defense in truly egregious circumstances.  
 Art V 1d sates that, “Enforcement may be denied if the composition of the 
arbitral authority or the arbitration procedure was not in accordance with the 
agreement of the parties or with the law of the country where the arbitration was 
held”.50 The main difference between the article V(1) and article V (2) defenses is  
that while the latter can be raised by both the court and the parties involved, the 
former is raised only by the party against whom the award is invoked. This 
defense too, like the V(1)b defense is given effect when enforcement would 
result in severe injustice to the parties involved and if the basic principles of 
justice are violated. 
Al Haddad Bros. v M/S Agapi    
                                                 
48 980 F.2d 141, *144 (2d Cir. 1992). 
49 See supra note 16 at 208. 
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The arbitration agreement between the parties provided for the arbitrators to be 
selected by each of the parties and if consensus was not be reached by the 
arbitrators, they were to select a third arbitrator.51 The nominee so elected was to 
decide the dispute. The decision in this case was in fact made by a single 
arbitrator. Al Haddad objected to the award pleading that there was violation of 
the due process clause as the award was not made in accordance with the 
agreement. 
            The court refused to accept this defense. Its reasoning was that the 
Convention recognized awards that were made in compliance with the laws of 
the state where the case was decided. According to the English laws, an award 
rendered by a single arbitrator was valid and hence it was enforced.52 The court 
also stated that the defect could not be considered fatal to the outcome of the 
award and the defense was thus rejected.53 
            Courts have given narrow construction and violation of domestic notions 
of due process does not mean that a foreign award will not be enforced. Thus 
due process exception applies only to those cases in which serious abnormalities 
in proceedings exist.54 
Imperial Ethiopian Government v. Baruch-Foster Corp.     
In this case, the agreement provided that the arbitrator should not have had any 
connections with the parties involved, direct or otherwise. Baruch Foster, the 
losing party discovered that the arbitrator had connections to the Ethiopian 
                                                                                                                                                 
50 New York Convention, supra note 17, art.V(1)(d). 
51 Al Haddad, 635 F. Supp. At 209. 
52 Id. at 210. 
53 See id. 
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government because he had previously drafted the Civil Code for the Ethiopian 
Government.55 He alleged that there was violation of due process as the 
selection process for the arbitrator was not consistent with the agreement. The 
District court rejected this defense and stated that Baruch Foster waived any 
objections to the selection of the arbitration panel.56 Baruch appealed the 
decision of the District Court. The Court of Appeals was also of the same view 
that the losing party’s allegations did not carry sufficient weight and confirmed the 
decision of the District Court.   
            Article V(1)(a) can also be argued to be part of the due process defense. 
Enforcement can be denied if the parties can prove that they lacked the capacity 
to consent or if the agreement was void under the applicable law.57 The consent 
given by the parties can be the focus of the dispute, or there may be fraud or 
duress involved. 
Question of Arbitrability 
The defenses of public policy and non arbitrable subject matter are often 
intertwined by courts and as non arbitrable subject matter forms part of the 
general concept of public policy, article V(2)a is also discussed. 
Article V(2)a states that enforcement may also be refused by courts if the subject 
matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law 
of that country.58 
                                                                                                                                                 
54 See supra note 16 at 211. 
55 535 F.2d 334, *335 (5th Cir. 1976). 
56 Id. at 336. 
57 New York Convention, supra note 17, art. V(1)(a). 
58 Id., art.V(2)(a). 
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            It should be noted that the above condition is also stated in article II(1) of 
the convention which compels courts of contracting states to recognize an 
arbitration agreement that concerns a subject matter capable of settlement by 
arbitration.59 
            Thus a party challenging the arbitrability of the dispute can raise this 
defense before the commencement of arbitration or at the award enforcement 
stage. The dividing line being thin, the question of arbitrability with respect to 
enforcement of awards and agreements are considered together. 
Arbitration in the field of Securities law. 
The U.S. securities law that can be found in the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were designed to protect investors from 
unscrupulous security dealers and to help them in making informed investment 
decisions.60 The first case that addressed the issue of arbitrability of securities 
law was that of Wilko v Swan. The case involved allegations by the Petitioner of 
misrepresentations by the brokerage firm that had sold some stocks to the 
Petitioner.61 When damages were asked for under section 12(2) of the Securities 
Act, the respondent’s arguments were that arbitration had to be conducted as per 
the agreement.62 The court rejected the arbitration policy as invalid and held that 
as a matter of public policy, securities law were inarbitrable.  
                                                 
59 see id., art II(1). 
60 Darrell Hall, No Way Out: An argument against permitting parties to opt out of U.S. securities 
laws in international transactions, 97 Colum L. Rev. 57, *59 (1997). 
61 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428-29. 
62 See id. at 429-30. 
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            The Supreme Court has since then reversed its original position and has 
allowed arbitration of the traditionally inarbitrable 1933, 1934 Securities Act and 
Sherman Acts. 
Scherk v Alberto Culver  
The case involved a forum selection clause of an agreement that provided for 
arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris.63 The choice 
of law was that of the laws of the state of Illinois. The dispute was over certain 
trademarks that were sold by a German seller to an American manufacturer. The 
allegations by the American buyer were that they were misrepresented and 
fraudulently sold to him and an action was started in the district court to rescind 
the contract.64 It was argued that there was a violation of section 10(b) of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and hence the arbitration clause was 
unenforceable. Scherk, the German seller tried to dismiss the suit and proceed 
with arbitration. Reversing the decisions of the District Court, the VII Circuit Court 
of Appeals and also that of its earlier precedents, the U.S. Supreme Court 
allowed arbitration of the 1933, 1934 Securities Acts.65 
            The court in the Alberto Culver’s case rendered a land mark decision that 
paved the way for arbitration of national laws. It distinguished this particular case 
from that of the Wilko due to the international nature of the agreement and 
secondly because there would be no clarity as to the applicable law in this case 
in the absence of a prior agreement.66 Also giving effect to the agreement was 
                                                 
63 Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 508 (1974). 
64 Id. at 509. 
65 See id. at 515. 
66 Id. 
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indispensable in order to achieve certainty in the field of international 
arbitration.67 The court stated that failure to give effect to the arbitration clause 
would result in the parties frustrating their original intent and would be abused as 
a tool in following delay-tactics that would ultimately result in destroying the very 
purpose of international arbitration.68  
            The court proceeded to remark that if any injustice had resulted in the 
course of arbitration the victimized party had always the remedy against 
enforcement by raising the public policy defense under the Convention. Thus the 
Supreme Court took the initial step in allowing national laws to fall under the 
purview of arbitration. This was a fatal mistake as only the national courts should 
exercise that power and court systems should not have abdicated this primary 
function to the wishes of the individual parties as to who should decide on 
national laws. A review of this case indicates that court had based its decision 
purely on the international nature of the arbitration involved and similar facts, in a 
domestic context would have produced a different result.  
            Two later cases that were decided in the 1980’s expanded the application 
of the Alberto doctrine to domestic securities disputes. In the case of 
Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, the claim was that a brokerage firm 
violated section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.69 The district court 
held that arbitration could be allowed, but the appellate court followed the Wilko 
doctrine. The Supreme Court decided in the context of the “federal policy 
                                                 
67 see id. at 516. 
68 Id. at 517. 
69 McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 223 (1987). 
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favoring arbitration”.70 It relied on the decision in the Mitsubishi case and held 
that arbitral tribunals, like judicial forums were well qualified and capable of 
deciding legal complexities and issues of the national laws even in the absence 
of judicial supervision.71 
            Thus the expansion of arbitration subjected the investors at a very high 
risk, depriving them of the protection offered to them under the securities laws. 
The parties could easily escape the reach of the national laws by turning to 
arbitration and if abused, this will only lead to the fall of arbitration.  
 
Arbitration and Antitrust 
The Sherman Act has been described as the Magna Carta of Free Enterprise as 
antitrust laws protect economic freedom and the laissez faire system.72 The 
purpose of the Act was to maintain unrestricted interaction of competition which 
is vital for economic growth and consumer protection. Due to this, American 
courts had long regarded antitrust laws as inarbitrable, because the nature of 
claim involves serious scrutiny and supervision that may be lacking in an arbitral 
forum. The case of American Safety Equipment v. J.P.McGuire embodied this 
doctrine. The Second Circuit Court after weighing various factors, rejected 
arbitration of a domestic licensing agreement that involved antitrust issues.73 But 
with the increase in international trade and the trend favoring arbitration this was 
also reversed. 
                                                 
70 Id. at 225-26. 
71 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
72 United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610(1972).  
73 391 F. 2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). 
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Mitsubishi v Soler  
 Although the case dealt with the enforcement of an arbitral agreement, article 
V(2)b played a part in the decision. Soler entered into a distributorship 
agreement with Chrysler International S.A, to sell Plymouth cars in an area in 
Puerto Rico. Later a sales agreement was entered into by Soler, CISA and 
Mitsubishi Motor Corp. that contained a clause for resolving any future disputes 
by arbitration under Japan Commercial Arbitration Association.74 The business 
venture functioned smoothly but later a dispute arose between Soler and 
Mitsubishi when the former was unable to satisfy its part of the bargain.75 The 
question in issue was whether arbitration could be held in Japan as per the 
agreement despite Soler’s allegations that anti trust claims under U.S. laws were 
to be decided only by courts. 
            The district court’s ruling in favor of arbitration was reversed by the circuit 
court which applied the American safety doctrine. The Supreme Court enforced 
the agreement and the arbitration clause. It held that the American safety 
doctrine was inapplicable in this context as the dispute arose from an 
international context. The reasons listed were concerns for international comity, 
respect for capacity of foreign tribunal and the need for certainty in the resolution 
of disputes.76  
             Also the court had in the earlier cases of Bremen and Scherk, decided 
that contracts made freely indicating choice of forum clauses were to be 
enforced, as this would be consistent with the intent of the New York 
                                                 
74 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3349 (1985). 
75 See id. 
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Convention.77 Appearance of an antitrust dispute and assumption that the arbitral 
panel lacked competence were not sufficient to nullify a freely negotiated 
agreement between the parties.78 As Japan also possessed a body of highly 
developed antitrust laws, and as the arbitrators were well qualified, arbitration 
was to go forward as U.S. courts always had the power to refuse enforcement if 
the antitrust issues were not properly decided by the panel.79 The public policy 
defense was to come into the picture at that stage.                                                                                
            The dissent by Justice Stevens was very strong. He correctly stated that, 
“vague concerns over comity were not to outweigh public policy”.80 He 
distinguished this case from Scherk as this case did not involve foreign laws and 
was totally under the realm of U.S. antitrust laws.81 He rightly pointed out that 
Congress did not authorize the transfer of decision-making authority of statutory 
claims from courts to that of arbitrators.82 He stated that under the New York 
Convention, “agreements requiring arbitration of disputes that were non 
arbitrable under domestic law were not to be honored”.83  
            This case is a clear example of how the Supreme Court sacrificed public 
policy in the name of international comity. It made certain assumptions that treble 
damages would be awarded by arbitral forums, parity of the effectiveness of 
arbitration to litigation, even though arbitrators are not required to state their 
                                                                                                                                                 
76 Id. at 3355. 
77 See id at 3357 
78 John R. Allison, Arbitration of Private Antitrust claims in International Trade: A Study in the 
Subordination of National Interests to the Demands of a World Market, 18 N.Y.U.J. Int’l L. & Pol. 
361, *428 (1986). 
79 Supra note 74 at 3357-58. 
80 Id. at 3365-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
81 See id. at 3373. 
82 Id. at 3364. 
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reasons in arriving at the award.84 The majority failed to give proper construction 
to the articles of the New York Convention and stressed the importance of the 
public policy defense although a study of the cases indicates that it is rarely 
successful.   
Arbitration and RICO statutes 
The Mitsubishi rationale has been extended by lower courts to another important 
arena of national laws namely the RICO statutes. The Racketeer Influence and 
Corrupt Organization statute allows the successful party to claim treble damages 
and litigation expenses in civil suits. The RICO statues have not made provisions 
for arbitration for such civil actions. In the case of Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, the 
third circuit court held that claims under RICO were inarbitrable as jurisdiction 
was obtained by violating section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.85 
            However in the case of Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 
the Supreme Court held that claims under section 10(b) of Securities Act of 1934 
and RICO must be arbitrated according to the arbitration agreement.86 As there 
was no specific legislation mandating non-enforcement of arbitration agreements 
arising under RICO suits, the court decided that the agreement to be valid.87 
The Mitsubishi rationale has been extended by lower courts to another important 
arena of national laws namely the RICO statutes. The Racketeer Influence and 
Corrupt Organization statute allows the successful party to claim treble damages 
and litigation expenses in civil suits. The RICO statues have not made provisions 
                                                                                                                                                 
83 See id. at 3371. 
84 Id. at 3357-60. 
85 797 F.2d 1197 at 1199 (3d Cir. 1986). 
86 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987). 
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for arbitration for such civil actions. In the case of Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, the 
third circuit court held that claims under RICO were inarbitrable as jurisdiction 
was obtained by violating section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.88 
            However in the case of Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 
the Supreme Court held that claims under section 10(b) of Securities Act of 1934 
and RICO must be arbitrated according to the arbitration agreement.89 As there 
was no specific legislation mandating non-enforcement of arbitration agreements 
arising under RICO suits, the court decided that the agreement to be valid.90 
 
Conclusion 
Most countries have recognized the advantages of arbitration in international 
trade and have attributed parity to that of litigation. Although this is to be 
welcomed, a careful look reveals that freedom if unchecked leads to abuse.  
Courts are extremely hesitant to use the defenses that are provided under the 
New York Convention. For instance, the public policy defense is interpreted so 
narrowly that it has become a ground for vacation in theory only. 
            Article V 2 b was intended to be a safeguard against unfair awards. 
However the pattern of monotonous rejection followed by U.S courts because of 
the failure to meet the Parson standard, sometimes leads to unjust results to the 
parties.91 The Parsons standards in turn is very vague and in the last thirty years 
the success rate of the public policy defense is negligent, thus indicating that 
                                                                                                                                                 
87 See id. 
88 797 F.2d 1197 at 1199 (3d Cir. 1986). 
89 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987). 
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better guidelines are required interpreting the “basic notions of morality and 
justice” standard. 
            The reluctance in erecting barriers initially could be understood as 
arbitration was in its early days of birth and required a lot of nurturing. But now 
that arbitration as an institution has been firmly established, it is now up to the 
courts to oversee its proper functioning in order to ensure its perpetual 
existence. The public policy exception should be made a more meaningful 
defense and this in turn will uphold the integrity of arbitration and ensure its long-
term survival. 
            The inarbitrability defense under article V(2)a, is another valuable tool 
given to courts and the parties under the NYC. Its original intent was to remove 
form the ambit of arbitration certain public issues of a significant nature, that only 
adjudication by national courts would be appropriate.92 For example, as 
discussed above, security, antitrust, RICO and other national laws are to be 
decided by courts. The main reason being, arbitrators resolve dispute between 
the parties but the court system goes a step further and are responsible for 
upholding the integrity of national laws.  
            The Supreme Court’s position with respect to the arbitrability of certain 
federal Acts should be viewed with extreme caution because disputes relating to 
certain federal statutes are best left to national courts.93 At the rate at which 
arbitration has been spreading steadily into all matters, it will come as no 
surprise one day if almost every international dispute can be arbitrated. Courts 
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should oversee the smooth functioning of arbitration without erecting too many 
hurdles but at the same time should not sacrifice its own public policies.94 
Otherwise parties may use arbitration as a tool to avoid laws that are of national 
importance which in turn will shake the foundation of this neutral and fair 
institution.95
                                                                                                                                                 
93 See note 5 at 1675. 
94 Supra note 8 at 283. 
95 See id. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PUBLIC POLICY DEFENSE & ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgements in General 
This section deals with the public policy defense and the enforcement of foreign 
country judgments. Within the U.S, the “full faith and credit clause applies to 
sister state judgments”.96 This means that judgments from other states are 
recognized and enforced in the same manner as that of judgments made within 
the state. Foreign judgments on the other hand are not accorded the same 
standing that is given to sister state judgments.97 Also, unlike in the field of 
arbitration, there are no international treaties and there is also the lack of federal 
legislation. Thus most of it has been left to the individual states and common law 
plays a predominant role.98  
            When a foreign judgment is sought enforcement in the court, the 
procedure is that the court will have to analyze and decide whether it can be 
recognized and enforced. Although in common parlance, these two terms are 
interchangeably used, there is a vital distinction between the two.99 Recognition 
always precedes enforcement.  Recognition means that the U.S. court after a 
detailed study of the case at hand is of the view that the matter in dispute has 
been thoroughly decided by the foreign court and that it does not require further 
                                                 
96 Article IV, section 1 of the constitution. 
97 Joseph J. Simeone, The Recognition and Enforceability of Foreign Country Judgments, 37 St. 
Louis U. L.J. 341, *342 (1993). 
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litigation.100 Enforcement means that a court will deliver the relief or the judgment 
of the foreign court.101 Another feature to be noted is that although recognition is 
essential for enforcement, it is does not always ensure enforcement. For 
instance, a plaintiff may require only recognition in order to dismiss a suit that 
has been instituted in another court.  In most cases, once recognition is received, 
the foreign judgment is given the same status as that of sister state judgments.102 
There is a lack of uniformity in U.S courts regarding the enforcement but the 
modern trend is that foreign judgment is conclusive if all the necessary requisites 
are met. 
Sources of Law 
In most cases involving the enforcement of a foreign judgment, state law is 
applied. However the Supreme Court has not specifically decided on this issue. A 
brief look into the sources of law will shed light on the applicability of the 
governing law. 
1. Federal common law. 
Although the Erie Railroad v Tompkins case removed the applicability of federal 
common law in diversity cases, the common law principle has been adopted by 
most states.103 The principle is embodied in the early case of Hilton v Guyot. The 
liquidator of a firm residing in France brought a suit against Hilton and Libbey, 
residents of New York to enforce a French judgment that allowed recovery of a 
                                                                                                                                                 
99 Jonathan H. Pittman, The Public Policy Exception to the Recognition of foreign judgments, 22 
Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 969, *969 (1989). 
100 Von Mehren & Patterson, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Country Judgments in the 
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101 Id at 38. 
102 See Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, s.3, 13 U.L.A. 265 (1988). 
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certain sum of money.104 The federal Court held the foreign judgment to be valid 
but the Supreme Court reversed the decision. Justice Gray in his often quoted 
decision held that “Enforcement of foreign judgment is not based on statute, 
treaty or the constitution but on the basis of comity.”105 “Comity is neither a 
matter of absolute obligation nor mere courtesy and good will.  It is the 
recognition which one nation accords to the judicial processes of another nation, 
having due regard …… to the rights of its own citizens who are under the 
protection of its laws.”106  
            This decision placed much emphasis on the reciprocity agreement 
between nations, and the lack of it resulted in the reversal. Although this rule of 
reciprocity has not been followed by most states, the doctrine of comity laid down 
in this case has come to play an important role in the courts decisions. 
2. Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act 
The common law modified by the Recognition Act that has been adopted by half 
of the U.S states.107 This act was proposed by National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State laws 30 years ago. It lays down the grounds for 
non-recognition of a foreign judgment. It not only applies to money judgments but 
is applicable to other judgments as well. 
3. Restatement (third) of foreign relations law. 
Like the Recognition Act, the purpose of the Re-statement was to codify the 
common law and to increase the likelihood that U.S judgments will be recognized 
                                                 
104 159 U.S. 113, *114 (1895).  
105 Id. at 227. 
106 See id. at 164-165. 
107 Supra note 93 at 352. 
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abroad in states with reciprocity requirements.108 There a couple of minor 
differences between the two namely, lack of subject matter jurisdiction mandatory 
ground for non - recognition under the act while only discretionary ground under 
the re-statement. Secondly, the act has forum non conveniens, a discretionary 
ground for non recognition.109 
Requirements for Recognition 
            The principles laid down in the Hilton case that were later codified in the 
Act and the Restatement lists certain requirements that are to be satisfied if a 
foreign judgment is to be recognized. The factors considered by courts are as 
follows: 
 1. Jurisdiction is an essential element. The foreign court delivering the judgment 
must have had “jurisdiction over the cause” in order to be recognized by U.S. 
courts.110 The standard applied is similar to that of sister state judgments and the 
“minimum contacts” test is the key in deciding this issue.111 When the defendant 
consents to the foreign court’s jurisdiction, the question is whether it was direct or 
indirect. Voluntary appearance by the defendant for other than the purpose of 
contesting jurisdiction is considered as giving consent.112 
2. The foreign judgment needs to be final and conclusive. In order to enforce a 
foreign judgment the court should be satisfied that the dispute was conclusively 
settled by the foreign court.113 If the decision can be appealed, it does not mean 
                                                 
108 Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of foreign money judgments in the U.S.: In search of uniformity 
and International Acceptance, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev., 253, *266 (1991). 
109 Id., 
110 Supra note 100 at 167. 
111 The test was laid down in the case of International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
112 Uniform Recognition Act, supra note 98, s. 5(a)(2). 
113 See e.g., Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313, 1323 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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that the foreign judgment will not be enforced. The defendant can show that the 
he intends to appeal or that one is pending, and the court has the option of 
staying the case until the resolution of the appeal.114  
3. A court may refuse enforcement of a foreign judgment if the judgment was 
defective because of fraud. Generally if the fraud is intrinsic, that is if it was 
related to an issue that could have been disputed, a foreign judgment is 
enforced.115 However if it is extrinsic in nature, then recognition is denied. The 
standard to be met by the defendant is by “clear and convincing evidence”.116 
4. Due process and foreign judgments.  
A foreign judgment is refused recognition if the basic principles of due process 
are not met. The court looks into whether the parties were given proper notice 
and opportunity to present their case in a meaningful manner.117 Differences 
between U.S. courts and foreign courts will not result in non-recognition. The 
foreign court procedures cannot be expected to be similar but needs to be 
compatible to those of U.S. due process requirements 
            Thus U.S. courts have enforced foreign judgments even when there was 
a lack of jury trial, pre-trial discovery procedures, absence of cross examinations 
and oral examinations. When enforcing a foreign judgment, the court analyzes 
the gravity of the due process violation and examines whether if not for the 
violation a different decision would have been forthcoming. 
                                                 
114 Supra note 98, s.6 
115 see supra note 104 at 980. 
116 Clarkson Co., v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 631 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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            The court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, held that a notice to the 
defendant in Hebrew language, would constitute proper notice.118 The defendant 
doing business in Israel for many years alleged that he did not understand the 
Hebrew language. The court was of the opinion that since the defendant was 
aware of the fact the documents served were legal in nature, ignoring it was his 
fault and found no due process violations.119 
            However in the case of Bank of Iran v. Pahlavi, a default judgment 
obtained by the bank against the sister of the former Shah of Iran was refused 
recognition by the California court.120 The political conditions in Iran made her 
entry into that country at high risk and as she did not have the opportunity to 
contest that case, it was not enforced. Due process also requires the foreign 
tribunal to be fair and impartial.121 Courts normally do not judge the judicial 
system of other countries and mere allegations of due process violations are not 
entertained by U.S. courts unless they have a solid basis. In one case, the 
federal court refused non-enforcement of an East German judgment as those 
courts “did not speak as an independent judiciary”.122 
5. Public policy exemption to the enforcement of foreign judgments.  
            The Court in Hilton v Guyot held that foreign judgment would not be 
recognized if doing so contravenes the public policy of United States.123  
Although, this defense may be raised whenever there is a difference in the 
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120 58 F. 3d 1406 (9th Cir. 1995). 
121 Supra note 100 at 202-03 (1895). 
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procedure, or if the result of the foreign court varies from that of the enforcing 
court, in practice the effectiveness of this defense is extremely restrictive. Under 
the Act, recognition is refused if the judgment is repugnant to the public policy of 
the state.124 Although no clear definition has been forthcoming, a certain 
standard has been followed in deciding whether public policy has been violated.  
Standard of Public Policy 
The principle laid down in the case of Somportex Ltd. V Philadelphia Chewing 
Gum Corp. forms the basis for setting public policy standards and has been cited 
very often. The case involved an agreement by which the plaintiff was to 
distribute the defendant’s goods in U.K.125 When the agreement did not 
materialize, the plaintiff sued for breach of contract, obtained a default judgment 
and sought enforcement in the U.S. courts.126 In addition to jurisdiction issues, 
the defendant contested that awarding of attorney fees and compensation of loss 
of good will was against the public policy of Pennsylvania but the district court for 
the eastern district of Pennsylvania held the damages awarded to be valid.127         
            The court took the view that “recognition will be refused only if it injures 
public health, morals, confidence in the purity of administration of law or 
undermines the sense of security for individual rights which any citizen ought to 
feel”.128 Thus a foreign judgment will normally be enforced unless it is contrary to 
the notions of justice and fairness.  
Foreign Judgments consistent with U.S public policy. 
                                                 
124 See Uniform Recognition Act, supra note 98, s. 4(b)(3). 
125 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972). 
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As there is no clear definition to the term public policy, it has been invoked as a 
defense to the recognition of foreign judgment in numerous cases. It should 
however be noted that courts have construed this defense narrowly and it has 
not been very successful.  
            In the case of Tahan v Hodgson, the defendant tried to block recognition 
of an Israeli default judgment. He alleged that enforcement would violate the 
public policy and the due process principles of U.S.129  The District Court decided 
in his favor holding that failure to issue the second notice violated the due 
process principles and also made the defendant liable for the actions of the 
corporation, stating that the public policy against “piercing the corporate had 
been violated”.130 The district court’s decision was reversed by the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia. The court was of the opinion that “mere 
differences in procedure would not justify non-recognition” and that the alleged 
due process violation was not contrary to the basic notions of fairness and 
decency.131 
            The court also stated that as Israel had similar corporate laws, the 
defendant could not claim the public policy defense especially when he had been 
given the notice and opportunity to contest for a similar decision that could be 
obtained in a U.S. court, but failed to appear.132 The fact that the defendant had 
defaulted played a role in the court’s decision. It can be seen that even when 
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contested, simple allegations of policy violations are insufficient. The party should 
be able to prove that a different result would be derived in a U.S. court. 
 Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v Granger  
            This case involved a dispute over freedom of employment contract. A 
Belgian court applying Belgian law awarded termination benefits to the 
defendant. The plaintiff brought a suit in the U.S. state court seeking a 
declaratory judgment that it was not liable to pay.133 The defendant (Granger) 
had the case switched to district court and sought enforcement.134 The plaintiff’s 
main argument was that there was a violation of public policy because the 
Belgian Court applied their law instead of the law of Illinois as indicated in the 
contract.135 The Illinois law favored freedom of contract and this would have been 
conducive to the plaintiff. However the district court found no violation and held 
that it was proper for the Belgian court to use their law as in similar 
circumstances a U.S. court would have done the same.136  
            To sum up, U.S. courts have enforced foreign judgments even when 
based on actions or procedures that are absent or vary under U.S. law.137 For 
example, courts have enforced foreign judgments for loss of good will, default 
judgments, repayment of gambling debts and attorney fees. In the case of 
Intercontinental Hotels Corp. (Puerto Rico) v. Golden, the New York Court of 
Appeals rejected the defendant’s claim that recovery of gambling debts violated 
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the states public policy.138  Although gambling agreements were illegal in New 
York, the court was of the opinion that, “the New York public does not consider 
authorized gambling a violation of ….. deep rooted traditions”.139  
            Thus courts have accorded recognition to foreign judgments in a very 
liberal manner. If all the abovementioned requisites are fulfilled, and if there is no 
grave violation of the basic policy and judicial principles, foreign judgments are 
generally enforced.  
Judgments Contrary to Public Policy. 
U.S courts do not recognize foreign penal and revenue judgments. A Philippines 
judgment was denied enforcement because the Govt. of Philippines imposed 
sanctions that were intended “to deter future actions and to promote public good 
instead of compensating the plaintiff”.140 Foreign judgments are generally refused 
recognition when important public issue policies are at stake. In cases in which 
public policy violations are found, societal interests rather than merely protecting 
litigant’s interests play a decisive role.141 The public policy exception has been 
successfully invoked to refuse enforcement of foreign libel judgments especially 
when it is contrary to the U.S. constitution.  
1. Bachchan v India abroad publications 
 This case involved a publication of an article in a Swedish newspaper about the 
Bofors scandal in which some friends of the late Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv 
Gandhi were accused of receiving funds from a Swedish arms dealer who tried to 
                                                 
138 203 N.E. 2d 210, *212 (N.Y. 1964). 
139 Id. at 213. 
140 821 F. Supp. 292, *298 (D.N.J. 1993).  
141 Von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 96, at 63. 
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make an arms deal with the Indian Government.142 The plaintiff brought a suit 
against India Abroad publications for having published this story in both the U.S. 
and U.K. editions. The jury awarded damages and recovery of attorney fees 
which the plaintiff tried to enforce in U.S.143 
            The defendant argued that there was a violation of the public policy as 
enforcement would jeopardize the protections offered by the First Amendment of 
the Constitution.144 The court after detailed analysis refused enforcement as 
British libel laws offered lesser protection and there existed fundamental 
differences between U.S. and British libel laws.145 Under the former, it did not 
matter if malice was a part of the defamation while under the latter, negligence 
and fault had to be proved. As the British libel laws did not afford this protection, 
enforcement would have resulted in curtailing the freedom of the press. Thus 
when the enforcement of a foreign judgment violated the public policy, non-
recognition is considered as “constitutionally mandatory”.146 
2. Ackermann v Levine 
            In this case, the defendant was involved with real estate dealings in New 
York and tried to get financial support from certain German investors.147 In the 
course of the dealings with the investors, he sought the services of the plaintiff, a 
German attorney. The fee payment was never discussed but at the end of the 
negotiations, the plaintiff charged a sum of money for his services according to 
                                                 
142 585 N.Y.S. 2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1992). 
143 Id. at 662. 
144 See id. 
145 Jeremy Maltby, Juggling comity & self government: The enforcement of foreign libel judgments 
in U.S. courts, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1978, *1995 (1994). 
146 Supra note 138 at 662. 
147 788 F. 2d at 834-36. 
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the rate as set down in the German statute.148 A default judgment was obtained 
in favor of the plaintiff in Germany and he tried to enforce in the New York Court. 
The district court refused enforcement because it was contrary to the public 
policy of the state. New York law requires disclosure of the billing procedure to 
the client and as this was lacking in this case, enforcement was denied.149 
            The court of appeals unlike the district court struck down only a portion of 
the German default judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff. It was of the 
reasoning that there existed a public policy violation in one aspect.150 State law 
required evidence of prior authorization and work being actually performed by the 
counsel.151 The judgment included fee for a particular study claimed to have 
been done by the counsel. As there was no proof that such a study was 
requested and performed, enforcement was denied because the state had a 
greater interest in not enforcing unconscionable attorney fees.152 
            The court was of the opinion that enforcement would make American 
citizens involved in international transactions vulnerable in their dealing with 
foreign attorneys. The court weighed the importance of international legal 
relations on one hand and enforcing foreign judgments on the other and voted in 
favor of the former.153 Thus it can be clearly seen that when important public 
policies are at issue, courts have refused enforcement of foreign judgments. 
 
 
                                                 
148 Id. at 835, 837. 
149 Id. at 841. 
150 Supra note 95 at 990. 
151 Supra note 143 at 843-44. 
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Conclusion  
A study of the cases reveal that U.S. courts have been liberally enforcing foreign 
judgments and that the public policy defense has been given a narrow 
construction by courts. However when there is a conflict of interest between 
enforcement of a foreign judgment and fundamental state policy, this defense 
has played an important role in non-enforcement.  This defense has been pivotal 
in non-recognition of a defective judgment especially when enforcement would 
undermine well-established legal and national policies. 
            At the national level, one matter that requires serious consideration is the 
lack of uniformity in U.S courts as to under what circumstances a foreign 
judgment will be enforced.154 This is because enforcement is left to individual 
state and this in turn depends on whether the state has adopted the Recognition 
Act or left to the states common law. One approach as Prof. Brand suggests 
would be the adoption of the Recognition Act by all the states or the enactment of 
federal legislation in this field preempting state legislations.155 
            Moreover, unlike in the field of arbitration, there are no treaties at the 
international level to which U.S is a party that would facilitate the enforcement of 
foreign judgments. The needs of international trade and commerce require one 
                                                                                                                                                 
152 Id. at 844. 
153 Id. 
154 Supra note 93 at 357. 
155 Supra note 104 at 285. 
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such multilateral convention and combined efforts have to be made to redress 
this situation.156
                                                 
156 Id. at 326. 
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CHAPTER 5 
COMPARISON OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE PUBLIC POLICY DEFENSE 
The above study shows that both foreign awards and judgments are liberally 
enforced by U.S. courts. With respect to the functioning of the public policy 
defense, courts narrowly interpret this defense and refuse enforcement only if it 
violates principles of morality and justice.157 Generally speaking, the defense has 
been successful only when fundamental interests of the enforcing state are 
violated.  
         Although the existence of this defense has been criticized by many as 
being detrimental to the free flow of foreign awards and judgments beyond a 
country’s borders, it can be clearly seen that this criticism suffers from lack of any 
basis and the fact is that the public policy defense is rarely successful.158 
            However, when a making a comparison, it is to be noted that this defense 
is used much more meaningfully in the context of foreign judgments than in the 
enforcement of foreign awards. Enforcement was denied on many occasions 
based on public policy grounds. Especially in cases where vital national policies 
are at stake, courts have taken a favorable attitude towards this defense. The 
Bachchan case is a good example where enforcement of a libel judgment was 
denied when the rights under the first amendment were violated. In the 
                                                 
157 See note 113 at 974. 
158 See Ackerman v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting the ”narrowness of the public 
policy exception, under which the standard is high and infrequently met”.) 
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Ackerman case, the public policy defense was successful as the state had a 
greater interest in not enforcing unconscionable attorney fees.159 
            The situation in the field of arbitration is different and though often 
invoked there are only a couple of cases where this defense has been successful 
and a French award was partially denied enforcement. In most of the cases, this 
defense has been very ineffective and courts have allowed arbitration of national 
laws thereby even violating fundamental state interest. 
            The decision of the D.C. Court of Appeals in the case of Laker v. Sabena 
in affirming the lower courts holding of granting anti suit injunction against the 
defendants is of much relevance here.160 In that case which involved antitrust 
issues, the court specifically held that, “the forum had a greater interest in seeing 
that important public policies are not evaded”.161 As the defendants were trying to 
escape application of antitrust laws to their conduct of business in the U.S., the 
injunction was upheld.162 Thus the reliance that issues on national laws will be 
properly decided by the arbitrators may backfire as the only goal of arbitrators is 
to amicably settle the dispute between parties. This calls for a meaningful 
application of the public policy defense in the enforcement of certain arbitration 
awards.
                                                 
159 supra note 95 at 991. 
160 731 F.2d 909, *919 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
161 Id. at 931. 
162 Id. at 932. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 It is very evident that with regards to enforcement of foreign arbitral agreements 
and awards, courts and the legislature have been removing all roadblocks in 
favor of complete arbitral freedom.163 However absolute and unchecked power 
may have serious consequences in the long run. The New York Convention has 
provided for legal barriers like the public policy defense, to prevent the 
enforcement of unjust awards by the receiving country. But the U.S. courts are 
following the Parsons standards of morality and justice, an old precedent being 
subjected to the strictest of interpretations. It is very doubtful if any case would 
satisfy this high level of scrutiny.  
            An ideal solution would be for the legislature to lay down the structure 
and standard of public policy so that courts can effectively use this defense 
against unfair results. The present standard is unclear as to how much opposed 
to law, an award should be in order to being struck down. Hence an initiative by 
the legislature in setting the standard followed by uniform interpretation by the 
courts would effectively re-instate public policy, a meaningful defense in the 
enforcement of foreign awards. 
            Also to be noted is that when enforcing domestic awards, the standard of 
public policy defense is less strict and in many cases it is possible to satisfy 
those standards. In a case decided by the Fifth Circuit it was held that when 
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enforcement compels violation of law or conduct contrary to accepted policy, 
such circumstances necessitated non-enforcement.164 This line of reasoning was 
followed in numerous domestic awards. Courts have thus taken a different stand 
when deciding foreign and domestic awards and this is well exemplified by 
looking into two similar cases with different outcomes.165 A foreign award was 
upheld even though a Pakistani judgment declaring the arbitration clause and 
proceeding to be void existed.166 On the other hand, even though similar public 
policy arguments were raised, a domestic award was vacated and the court 
highlighted the need to respect the judicial processes of other countries.167 A 
dual standard was followed and contrasting results were also arrived at when the 
partiality of the arbitrator was in issue in domestic and foreign contexts.   
            The issue is why courts continue to follow the double standard and 
whether it leads to unfair results. The courts willingness to recognize the public 
policy defense in case of domestic rather than foreign awards is very unclear.168 
Justice demands fairness to the parties and should not be based on the domestic 
or foreign nature of the arbitration. A solution worth looking into will be to follow 
the standard of domestic arbitral jurisprudence in all cases, namely a deferential 
stance towards arbitration but a case by case analysis of facts in order to prevent 
                                                                                                                                                 
163 See note 5 at 1688. 
164 416 F.2d 198, *201 (5th Cir. 1969). 
165 Eloise Henderson Bouzari, The Public policy exception to the enforcement of international 
arbitral awards: Implications for Post Nafta jurisprudence, 30 Tex. Int’l L.J. 205, *214 (1995). 
166 See note 38. 
167 Sea Dragon, Inc. v. Gebr. Van Weelde Scheepvaart Kantoor B.V., 574 F.Supp. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 
1983). 
168 Supra note 163 at 217. 
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unjust results.169 A middle path of protecting freedom of contract and state 
interest should be followed. 
            Since arbitration has been accorded an equal, if not greater status to that 
of the court system in the settlement of international commercial disputes, it is 
vital that there exists a limited amount of judicial review of awards.170 This is 
necessary to prevent defective awards and for the healthy survival of this 
institution.171 As Professor Park rightly points out, “there is no reason … that the 
neutrality of procedure and forum offered by arbitration cannot co-exist with 
limited court review of awards”.172  
With regard to enforcement of foreign judgments: 
Although foreign country judgments have generally been recognized and 
enforced in the U.S, non - recognition of U.S judgments abroad is the rule rather 
than the exception. Adoption of a multilateral convention for the enforcement of 
foreign judgments is the only remedy to this situation.173 The success of the New 
York Convention and the diminishing differences between litigation and 
arbitration indicates that this task may not be all that impossible. 
           Inclusion of the public policy defense will encourage any such efforts by 
the international community because a state may use it as a “safety valve” and 
refuse to enforce judgments that are contrary to its laws.174 Its role as a 
mechanism in defining and protecting state sovereignty should be highlighted 
                                                 
169 Id. at 215. 
170 See note 5 at 1696 
171 Id. 
172 See Park, National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in 
International Arbitration, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 647 (1989). 
173 See supra note 104 at 326. 
174 Supra note 133 at 818. 
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and this in turn would encourage reluctant countries in joining the Convention. 
The only requisite is that this defense calls for a meaningfully interpretation and 
not a broad one. Part II of the 19 th Session of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law which is scheduled to meet in the course of the year 2002, to 
analyze and hold successful negotiations for implementation of this project 
should consider the use public policy defense as an important tool in their 
negotiations in bringing about uniformity in this field.   
              To quote Prof. Behr, “in the short term, this defense is indispensable. In 
the long run, it is sensible to preserve an ultimate safeguard against unforeseen 
differences between domestic and foreign laws”.175 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
175 Volker Behr, Enforcement of United States Money Judgments in Germany, 13 J.L. & Com. 
211, 224 (1994). 
 51 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
Books 
 
 
The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958, Van den Berg, Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers, 1981 
 
The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration, Martin Domke, Wilmette, 
Illinois: Callaghan & Co., 1979 
 
Business Arbitration: What you need to know, Robert Coulson, 2nd ed., American 
Arbitration Association, 1982 
 
Transnational Business Problems – Second Edition, Detlev F. Vagts, University 
Casebook Series, 1998 
 
Transnational Legal Problems, Material and Text – Fourth Edition, Henry J. 
Steiner, and Detlev F. Vagts, University Casebook Series, 1994 
 
 
Journals 
 
 
Susan Choi, Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Awards under The ICSID and 
New York Conventions, 28 N.Y.U. J. Int’l & Pol. 175 (1996). 
 
Ramona Martinez, Recognition and Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards 
under the UN Convention of 1958: The Refusal Provisions, 24 Int’l Law. 487 
(1990). 
 
Kenneth - Michael Curtin, Redefining Public Policy in International Arbitration of 
National Mandatory Laws , 64 Def. Couns. J. 271 (1997). 
 
Jay R. Server, The Relaxation of Inarbitrability & Public Policy checks on U.S. 
and Foreign Arbitration: Arbitration out of control? 65 Tul. L. Rev. 1661 (1991). 
 
Andrew M. Campbell, Refusal to Enforce Foreign Arbitration Awards on Public 
Policy Grounds, 144 A.L.R. Fed. 481 (1998). 
 
Michael Mousa Karayanni, The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of 
Forum Selection, 34 Duq. L. Rev. 1009 (1996). 
 
Joseph T. McLaughin, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards under the New York 
Convention: Practice in U.S. Courts, 477 PLI/ Comm 275 (1988). 
  
52
 
 
  
 
Jonathan H. Pittman, The Public Policy Exception to the Recognition of Foreign 
Judgments, 22 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 969 (1989). 
 
Von Mehren & Patterson, Recognition & Enforcement of Foreign Country 
Judgments in The U.S., 6 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 37 (1974). 
 
Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the U.S: In 
search of Uniformity and International Acceptance, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 253 
(1991). 
 
Karen E. Minehan, The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments: Necessary or Nemesis? , 18 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 795 (1996). 
 
Jeremy Maltby, Juggling Comity & Self Govt.: The Enforcement of Foreign Libel 
Judgments in U.S. Courts, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1978 (1994). 
 
 
Case Laws 
 
 
Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de l ‘Industrie du 
Papier, 508 F. 2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974) 
 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1983) 
 
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506 (1974) 
 
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1958) 
 
Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens v. Southwire Co., 484 F. Supp. 1063 
(N.D. Ga. 1980) 
 
Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio 1981) 
 
Waterside Ocean Navigation Co. v. International Navigation, 737 F.2d 150 (2d 
Cir. 1984) 
 
American Construction v. Mechanized Construction of Pakistan, 659 F. Supp. 
426 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 
 
Brandeis Intsel Ltd. v. Calabrian Chemicals Corp., 656 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987) 
 
Imperial Ethiopian Government v. Baruch Foster Corp., 535 F. 2d 234 (5th Cir. 
1976) 
  
53
 
 
  
 
Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F. 2d 435, (3d Cir. 
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972) 
 
Laker v. Sabena, 731 F. 2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
 
Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F. 2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
 
Ingersoll Milling Machine Co., v. Granger, 631 F. Supp. 314 (N.D.III. 1986), aff’d, 
833 F. 2d 680 (7th Cir. 1987) 
 
Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, 585 N.Y.S. 2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1992) 
 
 
 
